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THE RATIONAL LIMITS OF TRADEMARK LAW (2000)
Graeme B. Dinwoodie*
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the reach of U.S. trademark law has significantly
expanded in several different ways. In this Essay, I will focus on three expansions that have
tested the limits of trademark law: the subject matter potentially protected as trademarks has
become virtually unlimited; the scope of rights afforded a trademark owner has been
extended to prevent noncompeting uses by others that are not likely to cause consumer
confusion but which may dilute the distinctiveness of the trademark owner’s mark; and, most
recently, trademarks have been reflexively afforded additional protection against conduct
known as cybersquatting. After reviewing these three developments, I will suggest that each
implicates in its own way a fundamental question about the direction of U.S. trademark law:
what is to be the lodestar that will guide trademark law and help establish rational limits on
protection?1 I argue that trademark law must develop by explicit reference to its basic
purposes. Although these purposes are somewhat general and more varied in nature than
often recognized, attention to them will ground trademark law in present commercial reality
without foreclosing adaptation to future social developments. Trademark law is a mercantile
law. As such, it is (and must be) both shaped and limited by the market forces that it seeks
to regulate. To be sure, it must not become entirely hostage to market forces; on occasion,
trademark law will need to recognize and act on its capacity to construct the market. But,
even there, trademark law must pay attention to empirical realities (if only to determine when
to do more than react to the market). That is, recognizing limits – whether by reacting to, or
shaping, market forces – is best achieved through purposive analysis. In the three areas
canvassed in this essay, however, the courts and Congress are marking out a different path,
involving ad hoc delineation of trademark holders’ rights in response to the latest perceived
social or economic threats to brand values.
If one seeks to pursue a purposive approach to trademark law, then one must
first identify the basic purposes of trademark protection. In this Essay, I will reaffirm the
classic avoidance of consumer confusion rationale as more than sufficient to serve the
legitimate concerns of producers, especially as that rationale has been implemented by U.S.
courts in recent years. The basic fairness and utility of this purpose is evidenced, perhaps,
*

Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks to Mark Janis, Graeme Austin, and Brian
Havel for comments on an earlier draft. Copyright 2000, 2005, Graeme B. Dinwoodie.
1

By this title, I consciously seek to invoke the wo rk of Frank Schechter, whose 1927 Harvard Law
Review article The Rational Basis of Trademark Law has found substantial vindication in current (i.e. 2000)
U.S. attitudes toward the scop e of trad emark rights. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade mark
Protection, 40 H ARV . L. R EV . 813 (19 27).
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by the fact that tying the limits of trademark law to it would draw a balanced and flexible line
through the three difficult issues that I discuss. Purposive analysis reflective of the
confusion-avoidance rationale offers the possibility, dependent upon social and economic
developments, of more generous trade dress protection than under the categorical approach
recently endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court. But it would limit the scope of trademark
rights more narrowly than Congress has done in the federal dilution statute. And it would
offer a workable vehicle for addressing conflicts between domain names and trademark
rights without detailed congressional legislation.
But, more important than the specific balance that this purposive approach
strikes in particular settings, it would guide the courts in establishing rational limits to
trademark law. This is not to say that limits on trademark law might not appropriately
emanate from other sources or objectives. But a sense of principled direction is sadly
missing from many recent developments. Purposive analysis would ground trademark law
in social and market realities; absent that grounding, trademark law may become a vehicle
for mere rent seeking. And, as different intellectual property rights converge and trademark
rights come to protect subject matter protected by other regimes such as copyright or patent,
the strength of trademark law’s claim to regulate such matter in a manner different from
those other regimes rests upon the policies of trademark law retaining a distinctive hue.
Purposive analysis will ensure that trademark law retains that characteristic coloration.
I. The Subject Matter of Trademark Protection:
Trade Dress and “Tertium Quids”
Recent years have seen an explosion in the number of so-called “trade dress”
infringement cases brought under the federal trademark statute,2 the Lanham Act.3 Indeed,
all three trademark opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the last decade have involved
trade dress,4 and the Court has just agreed to hear another trade dress case next term.5 The
term “trade dress” is used to refer to source-identifying subject matter other than words or
two-dimensional pictorial images; in particular, it commonly refers to the source-identifying

2

For a survey of the volume of product design trade dress litigation in particular over the last decade,
see Graeme B. D inwoo die, The Death of O ntology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L.
R EV . 611, 623 n.58 (1999) (listing number of reported cases annually). See also Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress
Protection For P roduct Configurations: Is There a Conflict with Patent Policy?, 24 AM . I NT ELL . P R O P . L.
A SS ’N Q.J. 427, 430 -31 (1996) (noting burgeoning trade dress litigation).
3

15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-11 27 (199 4).

4

See Two P esos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 50 5 U .S. 76 3 (1992 ); Qualitex Co. v. Jacob sen P roducts.,
514 U .S. 159 (1995 ); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
5

See Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 2715 (2000).
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aspects of a product’s packaging, color, or design.6 Courts in the United States have long
protected the packaging of a product under trademark law,7 and since 1976 the federal courts
have also recognized that consumers might identify the source of a product by its design or
configuration.8 In 1995, the United States Supreme Court resolved a split among the lower
courts and held that the mere color of a product could be registered as a trademark.9 Indeed,
in that case, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products,10 the Court went so far as to comment that,
under the statutory definition of “trademark,” anything that is capable of carrying meaning
can serve as the subject matter of a trademark.11
Although these expansions in trademark subject matter raise more difficult
issues for trademark law than according protection to words or two dimensional images,12
contemplating possible protection is wholly consistent with the underlying purposes of
trademark law. Trademark law protects symbols that identify the source of goods and
distinguish those goods from the goods of another producer. If a competitor were able to
market its goods under a confusingly similar symbol, consumers may mistakenly purchase
the wrong goods, and the producer’s investment in the goodwill of the product would be
6

The term “trademark” is conventionally reserved for situations where the ide ntifier of a produ ct's
source is a word or pictorial symb ol, but the significan ce of this termino logy is no w slight. See Blau Plumbing,
Inc. v. S.O .S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 60 4, 608 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that there was “no substantive
difference” between trade dress and trademarks). As discussed more fully below, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Two Pesos supports the suggestion that the terminology is of lesser significance, while the Court’s more
recent decisio n in Wal-Mart Stores tends to suggest otherwise (at least with respect to trade dress consisting
of pro duct design). See infra text accompanying notes 39-70.
7

See, e.g., Eastman Ko dak Co. v. Royal Pioneer Paper Box Mfg., 197 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961)
(packaging for photographic p roducts); see also George B asch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir.
1992) (container for metal polish).
8

See Truck Eq uipment Serv. Corp. v. Fruehauf, 536 F .2d 1 210 (8th C ir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976) ("TESCO") (protecting the ap pearance of the ho ppe r of a truck); see also Jessica Litman , Note, The
Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82
C O LU M . L. R EV . 77, 83 (198 2) (identifying TESCO as the first successful product design infringe ment claim
under the Lanham Act).
9

See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). Although the Supreme Court has not
expressly addressed the issue, it is broadly accepted that other subject matter such as sounds (and perhaps even
smells) can serve as tra dem arks. See id. at 162 (“If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why,
one might ask, can a color not do the same?”); see, e.g. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1240 (T.T.A.B.
1990) (scent of thread acted to identify source if thread).
10

514 U .S. 159 (1995 ).

11

See id. at 162.

12

See Dinw ood ie, supra note 2, at 624-45. These issues can be addressed by doctrinal vehicles, such
as the doctrine of functionality, that are closely tied to competing or additional purposes of trademark, name ly
not to undermine the patent system and to avoid anticompe titive effects. See id. at 684-751.
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appropriated.13 Trademark protection against confusing simulation thus advances the
interests of producers and consumers by protecting the integrity of consumer understanding
and the producer’s investment in creating goodwill. In turn, trademark protection reduces
the customer's costs of shopping and encourages the production of quality products.14
If consumers identify a product by its packaging, color or design features,
these same concerns are implicated to no less an extent even though countervailing concerns
related to competition might also be heightened. This purposive analysis of trademark
protection undergirds large parts of the opinions in Qualitex and Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc.15 It is in part because trade dress can serve the purpose of a trademark, and
because the nature of the subject matter is thus irrelevant to the purpose of trademark law,
that the Court removed limits on trademark protection derived from the nature or
classification of the subject matter.16 But an essential premise underlying this argument is
a mark's distinctiveness, i.e., the claimed mark must represent a feature by which consumers
identify and distinguish a product from others. Distinctiveness is central to trademark
protection because, without it, no goodwill attaches to the claimed mark and thus no
consumers will be confused by others using the same mark. “A consumer must recognize
that a particularly packaged product comes from Source A before she can be confused by a
similar package from Source B.”17
The distinctiveness of trade dress has thus been one of the principal subjects
of the recent Supreme Court case law. It is the rock upon which the expansion of trademark
subject matter has been built, both factually and legally. The factual premises have been
established by the growing visuality of contemporary society.18 And in 1992, in Two Pesos,

13

Two primary justifications have traditionally been offered in support of tradem ark protection: to
"protect the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which
it favorably kno ws, it will get the product which it asks for and which it wants to get"; and to ensure that "where
the owner of a trademark has spent ene rgy, time and money in presenting to the public the p roduct, he is
protected in his investment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats." S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (19 46). Ma ny limits can also be deduced internally from these justifications. Other limits may reflect
additional policy values. See Graeme B. D inwoo die, Trade mark Law and Social Norms, Working paper on
file with the author.
14

See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods., 514 U .S. 159, 163-164 (1 995).

15

See, e.g., Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773 -75; Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163 -64.

16

For a fuller explication o f the Co urt’s purposive analysis, see Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 645-56.

17

Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 46 7, 472 n.5 (3d C ir. 1990).

18

See generally M ITCH ELL S T E PH E N S, T HE R ISE OF THE I MAGE , T HE F A LL OF THE W ORD (1998); see
also Bernard Stamler, Mo ther Jo nes R eturn s to Ro ots With New Look, N.Y. T IMES , Aug. 17, 1998, at C7
(reporting views of Jeffrey Klein, founder of Mother Jones magaz ine, that “there is an emerging next generation
. . . but their language is not the same. This generation communicates visually as well as verbally.”).
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Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,19 the Court, in the course of upholding trademark protection for
the decor and ambiance of a Mexican fast-food restaurant against replication by a competitor,
laid the corresponding legal foundation when it approved the assimilation of the principles
governing the distinctiveness of verbal trademarks and non-verbal trade dress. In particular,
the Court held that the distinctiveness of non-verbal trade dress may (like verbal marks) be
established by proof of either inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning.20 Prior to Two
Pesos, the circuit courts were divided on whether trade dress could be inherently distinctive;
some, such as the Second Circuit, required evidence of secondary meaning before offering
protection to trade dress.21
The Two Pesos decision was, however, incomplete in two primary respects.
First, it failed to address the means by which the assimilation of the principles governing the
distinctiveness of verbal marks and non-verbal dress was to be effected. Classical
distinctiveness analysis22 was developed to adjudicate the protectability of verbal or pictorial
marks, and those modes of analysis proved inadequate when transplanted to trade dress.
They were particularly deficient when applied to determine whether a design feature was
distinctive. Thus, lower courts struggled with the development and application of tests
designed to measure the distinctiveness of trade dress. Some continued to apply the classical
(Abercrombie) test used with respect to word marks.23 Others applied different tests to

19

505 U .S. 763 (1992 ).

20

Secondary meaning exists when consumers over time come to associate the word or dress in question
with a single so urce. See R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF U NFAIR C OM PE TIT IO N § 13 cmt. e (1995) (“Secondary
meaning exists only if a significant numbe r of pro spective purchasers und erstand the term, when used in
connection with a particular kind of good , service, or business, not merely in its lexicographic sense, but also
as an indication of association with a particular, even if anonymous, entity”).
21

See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade
Dress, 75 N O R T H C AROLINA L. R EV . 471, 488-92 (19 97).
22

Under U.S. law, distinctiveness is measured by locating the mark in one of a spectrum of conceptual
categories that “blend without clear differentiation into one another.” See id. at 485. A mark will be regarded
as inherently distinctive if it is “fanciful”, “arbitrary” or “suggestive” in relation to the goods upon which it is
affixed. Marks classified as " descriptive" of the go ods are no t inherently distinctive and ca n be p rotected only
upon proof that they have actually acquired distinc tiveness in the minds of consumers. See generally
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
23

See, e.g., Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying same doctrinal
tests to trade dress and trademarks); Kompan A .S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167, 1174 (N.D.N.Y.
1995); see also Sunbeam Pro ds. v. W est Bend Co., 123 F .3d 246, 252 & 260 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying
Abercro mb ie to product design despite express recognition of differences b etween words and designs). This
approach was sup ported by some scho lars. See, e.g, David W . Opderb eck, Form and Function: Protecting
Trade Dress Rights in Product Configurations, 20 SE T ON H ALL . L EG IS . J. 1, 38 (1996) (endorsing application
of Abercro mb ie to pro duct design); see also Dratler, supra note 2, at 488-92 (approving application of
Abercro mb ie if conceived of in terms of range of alternative designs).
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measure trade dress distinctiveness, such as the so-called Seabrook test, which called upon
a court to consider whether a shape or packaging feature was “a common, basic shape or
design, whether it [was] unique or unusual in a particular field, or whether it [was] a mere
refinement of commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular
class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods.”24 Finally,
some concluded that while existing distinctiveness analysis might helpfully assist in an
evaluation of the distinctiveness of product packaging, it was unhelpful in the case of product
design,25 and thus developed different tests depending upon the category – design or
packaging – into which the trade dress fell.26
This final approach required the courts in question to develop new analytical
devices with which to measure the distinctiveness of product design.27 The tests that they
developed28 were unduly complex and tended to provide lesser trade dress protection for
product designs than for packaging. 29 This result was justified in large part by the contention
that design features were less likely to act as trademarks for consumers (although, more
candidly, might have been supported by countervailing concerns apart from

24

Seabrook Fo ods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 13 42, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977).

25

This difficulty arises for two primary reasons. First, the Abercro mb ie formulation is ro oted in
notions, such as descriptiveness, that tap into our facility with the meaning of words and are thus less intuitive
in the case of non -verbal signs. Second, in product design cases, unlike those involving product packaging or
words affixed to prod ucts, courts saw no obvious relationship between the mark and the product which
comprised the mark, and it is that relationship to which the Abercro mb ie test was directed . See Durac o Pro ds.
v. Joy Plastic Enters., 41 F.3d 1431, 1441 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The very basis for the trademark taxonomy -- the
descriptive relationship between the mark and the product, along with the degree to which the mark describes
the product -- is unsuited fo r app lication to the pro duct itself.”); id. at 1434 (“[T ]raditional trade dress doctrine
does not ‘fit’ a product configuration case because unlike product packaging, a product configuration differs
fundamentally from a product's trademark, insofar as it is not a symbol according to which one can relate the
signifier (the trademark, or perh aps the pack aging) to the signified (the p roduct))”; id. at 1440-41 (“Being
constitutive of the product itself and thus having no such dialectical relationship to the product, the prod uct's
configuration canno t be said to be ‘suggestive’ or ‘descriptive’ of the p roduct, or ‘arbitrary’ o r ‘fanciful’ in
relation to it.”).
26

See, e.g., Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 41 F.3d 143 1 (3d Cir. 1994 ); Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
27

It should also have caused consideration of how to distinguish between packaging and design. See
infra text accompanying notes 65-67 (discussing Wal-Mart Stores).
28

See, e.g., Duraco, 41 F.3d at 1434 & 1448-49 (holding that “to be inherently distinctive, a product
feature or a combination or arrangement of features, i.e., a product configuration, for which Lanham Act
protection is sought must be (i) unusual and memorable, (ii) conc eptua lly separable fro m the p roduct, and (iii)
likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product”).
29

See Dinw ood ie, supra note 21, at 553-62 (discussing effects of these tests).
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distinctiveness).30
The development of separate approaches to different categories of trade dress
tied in with the second incomplete aspect of Two Pesos. The extent of the assimilation
announced by the Two Pesos court was unclear: did it apply to forms of trade dress other
than restaurant decor? In particular, did it apply to product design? Courts developing the
new (and stricter) tests for inherent distinctiveness of product designs largely proceeded on
the assumption that Two Pesos did require the possibility of inherently distinctive product
designs.31 But they also concluded that Two Pesos did not foreclose them from developing
separate tests that might confine the circumstances in which that legal conclusion would be
reached.32 By either route -- blanket denials of inherent distinctiveness, or tests that
effectively precluded the possibility -- a categorical approach that distinguished between
packaging and design was being forged.33
Throughout the 1990s, it was far from clear which approach to trade dress –
the purposive or the categorical – would prevail. The Court's subsequent decision in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods., in which the Court recognized that a color per se could be
registered as a product's trademark under the Lanham Act, did not answer this question. The
Qualitex opinion can be read as expansionist in nature, in that it endorsed the disregard of
limits on trademark subject matter; and the Court rejected the formulation of blanket rules
of trademark law based upon problems that might occasionally be presented by this new
subject matter. But the Court also analogized color to descriptive marks and thus appeared
to require secondary meaning as a prerequisite to protection.34 These mixed signals

30

See Duraco, 40 F .3d at 1 44 8 (“[A] consume r is substantially mo re likely to trust a prod uct's
packaging rather than its configuration as an indicium of source.”); Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d
996 , 100 7-08 (2d Cir. 19 95); see also EFS M ktg. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1996) (2d
Cir. 1996) (“In Knitwaves, . . . we explained that product-configuration trade dresses are less likely than
packaging-configuration dresses to serve the source-identification function that is a prerequisite to Lanham Act
protection. . . [Consumers] are more likely to be attracted to the product for the product's features, rather than
for the source-identifying role the features might play.”).
31
See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1445-6 ("[W]e do read Two Pesos as giving an imprimatur to finding trade
dress in a product configuration to be inherently distinctive under certain narrow circumstances.")
32

See id. at 1442.

33

In part, it might be viewed as the re-establishment of a traditional distinction between packaging and
design. See Jerome H. Reichm an, Design Protection And The New Technologies: The United States
Experience In A Transnational Perspective, 19 U. B ALT . L. R EV . 6, 87 (1989).
34

The Qualitex Court contrasted marks consisting of color per se with inherently distinctive marks and
compared them with descriptive terms. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162 -63 (noting that "a product's color is
unlike ‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘suggestive’ words or designs, which almost automatically tell a customer which
brand they refer to"); id. (analogizing consumer association with color to descriptive terms, and stating that lack
of objection to protection existed with respect to color that has attained secondary meaning); id. at 1307 (logic
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suggested, perhaps, an unease with extending the assimilationist decision in Two Pesos too
far. The policy considerations, and exercises in statutory interpretation, that led the Two
Pesos court to recognize inherently distinctive trade dress, should in theory permit of the
same argument with respect to color. And it should do likewise with product design. But
Qualitex contained hints of caution with respect to color, and some lower courts found room
in Two Pesos to inject similar restrictions into the protection of product design.
This brief summary of judicial developments does not capture the range of
divergent approaches that developed in the lower courts.35 Courts were pervasively divided,
and a congressional effort to resolve the splits in the lower courts, which would have
involved legislating a single test (modeled on the Seabrook test) for all trade dress, stalled
in the face of opposition from constituents of the relevant House sub-committee chair.36 In
March 2000, however, the U.S. Supreme Court answered some of these open questions. In
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.,37 the Court granted certiorari on the question
“what must be shown to establish that a product's design is inherently distinctive for purposes
of Lanham Act trade-dress protection?”38
Wal-Mart involved trade dress rights that the plaintiff claimed in the design
of a line of children’s seersucker clothing. The plaintiff had prevailed before the Second
Circuit, where the court had found the design to be inherently distinctive. Although the
Court granted certiorari to determine, “what must be shown to establish that a product’s
design is inherently distinctive for purposes of Lanham Act trade-dress protection?,” WalMart argued that product designs could be protectable trade dress only if secondary meaning
was shown. In a unanimous decision the Court accepted that argument, concluding that
while packaging may be inherently distinctive, product design may not.39 Thus, although the
court endorsed an expansive view of trademark subject matter, it also supported a categorical
distinction between packaging (which could be inherently distinctive) and product design
of protecting descriptive marks that have acquired secondary meaning applies also to color per se); see also
Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 199 5) ("In light of the Supreme Cou rt's
decision in Qualitex, color is capable of obtaining trademark status in the same ma nner [as] a descriptive mark
. . . by attaining secondary meaning."); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008 (2d Cir. 1 995)
("[The Qualitex] court conc luded [that] a pro duct's color is . . . eligible for trad emark pro tection only when it
acquires secondary meaning . . .").
35

For a fuller analysis, see D ratler, supra note 2 , at 469 -506 ; Dinwood ie, supra note 2, at 656-80.

36

See Trade Dress Protection Act, H.R. 3163, 105 th Cong. (articulating predictive test for determining
distinctiveness of trade dress and listing non-exclusive factors).
37

120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).

38

See W al-Mart v. Samara Bros, 120 S. Ct. 308 (1 999).

39

The respond ent, Samara Bro thers, had argued (with som e basis but ultimately unsuccessfully) that
that question was not encompa ssed b y the certiorari grant.
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(which could not). It thus raised to the surface the ambivalence that underlay Qualitex.
That the Court was operating from a different mindset is seen by its
interpretive use of Section 2 of the Lanham Act. Section 2 lists the grounds upon which a
federal trademark registration may be denied; it makes no reference to trademark subject
matter. In Two Pesos, the Court interpreted that silence as suggesting no basis upon which
to make a distinction between different types of trademark subject matter;40 eight years later,
the court read that silence as suggesting no barrier to the development of such a distinction.41
Similarly, although the Qualitex court has analogized color to descriptive marks, the court
in Wal-Mart made explicit that in Qualitex “we held that a color could be protected as a
trademark, but only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”42
What had altered the Court’s perspective in eight years? The Court marshaled
two primary reasons for requiring secondary meaning for product design protection. First,
the Court suggested that product designs do not automatically identify source for consumers
in the way that packaging or words marks do.43 This categorical conclusion probably bears
some incidental correlation to present social reality. But there may be circumstances in
which it does not, and indeed those circumstances may become more frequent as society
becomes more visual and global marketing reduces reliance on linguistic forms of
communication.44 If the Court believed it less likely that consumers would identify a product
by its design than by its packaging, it could have adopted a test (like Seabrook) that enables
courts to ask that very question.45 Instead, the Court foreclosed individualized scrutiny of
its (unsupported) social generalization, by embedding that generalization as a rule of law.

40

See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772-774 (White J.) (finding no textual basis for distinction between trade
dress and trademarks either in registration or infringement provisions of statute).
41

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 120 S. Ct. at 1343-44.

42

Id. at 1344.

43

See id.

44
See Dinw ood ie, supra note 2, at 639-45. The internet may change things in ways that are as yet
unclear. Thus, while global marketing (facilitated by the internet) might highlight the use of non-verbal sym bols
to bridge cultural and linguistic divides, the internet is still hea vily text-dependent. For example, the means of
searching the internet will likely affect the means by which online consum ers identify and distinguish prod ucts,
and the leading search engines are text based. But this facet of the internet may be changing. See Kelly v.
Arriba Software, 77 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that a “visual search engine” that copied
images in the course of indexing images necessary to fulfil its search engine function was protected by the
copyright fair use doctrine), aff’d in part, rec’d in part, 336 F.3d 811 (9 th Cir. 2003).
45

The Wal-M art court’s focus o n the producer’s p urpo se in selecting the word or design as relevant
to distinctiveness fund amentally misun derstands trademark law. See Dinw ood ie, supra note 21, at 547 (noting
that distinctiveness and trademark protection is based upon “public association, not private aspiration”).
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Given the reluctance of the Court in Qualitex to develop rules of law based
upon blanket assumptions,46 the thinking that persuaded the court to entrench an increasingly
questionable factual premise as a rule of law is more candidily revealed by the second reason
tendered by the Court. The Court feared that broad product design trade dress protection
might have anticompetitive effects because design, unlike packaging or words, serves
purposes other than source identification.47 Concern for the potentially anticompetitive
effects of trade dress protection is typically reflected in the functionality analysis, whereby
a design found to be “functional” will be unprotected by trademark.48 Indeed, the Qualitex
opinion “elevated the importance of the functionality doctrine by casting it – and not the
ontological status of the mark subject matter – as the sentinel of competition.”49 And, since
Qualitex, Congress has heightened the efficacy of the functionality doctrine by imposing the
burden on that question on a plaintiff where the design is not registered as a trademark.50
Despite this, the Wal-Mart court viewed the mere possibility of a claim of
inherently distinctive product design trade dress as a threat to competition because a rule of
law permitting such a claim would “facilitate plausible threats of suit against new entrants
based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.”51 The court’s fear of such suits stemmed from
its lack of confidence that a clear test for the inherent distinctiveness of product design could
be devised.52 At oral argument, and in the briefs submitted to the Court, the possible test
upon which most debate centered was the Seabrook test.53 Although Samara argued that
application of the classical Abercombie trademark test54 should, under Two Pesos, be applied
to all trade dress, its more significant argument had been that the Seabrook test could provide
46

See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 168 (rejec ting rule prohibiting protection of color per se because “it relie[d]
on an occasional problem to justify a blanket prohibition.”)
47

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1344.

48

The doctrine of functionality denies the grant of trade dress rights where pro tection wo uld
significantly hinder competition (because a competitor needs to be able to use the trade dress feature in order
to com pete e ffectively) or would und ermine the limits o f the patent system. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165
(“This court . . . has expla ined th at ‘in general terms, a product feature is functional,’ and cann ot serve as a
trademark, ‘if it is essential to the use or purp ose o f the article o r if its affects the co st or quality of the article,’
that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation related
disadvantage”).
49

See Dinw ood ie, supra note 2, at 655.

50

See 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(a)(3) (W est Supp. 1999).

51

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1344.

52

See id. at 1344-1345.

53

See sup ra text accompanying note 24.

54

See sup ra note 22.
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appropriate guidance in trade dress cases. And the Seabrook test was also endorsed by
various amici, including the United States government.55
The Seabrook test does, however, suffer from one conspicuous frailty.
Without an overarching test, a mere assessment of “uniqueness” is irrelevant to trademark
law. The justices noted as much at oral argument, as had scholars before them.56 The
Seabrook test will only work – but will work – if it is viewed in light of the overarching
inquiry of whether consumers are likely to identify the product in question by its design.
Without repeating the explanations I have sketched elsewhere of how this test could be made
to work and serve the purposes of trademark law,57 suffice it so say that the government
compounded the weakness of Seabrook operating without any such overarching inquiry by
refusing at oral argument to answer questions regarding how Seabrook would be applied in
the case before the Court.58 The justices reacted adversely to that response at oral
argument,59 and the Court (perhaps understandably) responded in its opinion with a
conclusion that the test was “insufficiently clear to provide the basis for summary disposition
of an anticompetitive strike suit.”60
Because such arguments regarding the overarching purpose of the Seabrook
test were not put to the court,61 the holding was as much grounded on concern over the anticompetitive effects of uncertain doctrinal tests,62 as on a firm conviction that a secondary
meaning requirement was warranted either by the purposes of trademark law or was rooted
in the statutory language.

55

See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, 1999 WL 1 045127 at
* 8; Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 72053 at * 19.
56

See Dinw ood ie, supra note 2 , at 658 -59 n.195 ; Transcript of Oral Argument, 200 0 W L 72 053 at *

40-43.
57

For an fuller explication of how the Seabrook test can be used in tandem with an overarching
pred ictive inquiry, see D inwoo die, supra note 21, at 568-602.
58

See Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 72053 at * 20.
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See id. at * 20-21.

60

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1345.
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During oral argument, some members of the Court appeared to be searching for such guidance (by
supplementing the Seabrook inquiry with “add itional questions”), but counsel for Samara resisted such efforts
out of a concern that any form ulation w ould tend toward a requirement of secondary m eaning . See Transcript
of Oral Argument, 2000 W L 72 053 at * 40-4 1. But this need not be the case. See Dinwoodie, supra note 21,
at 568-602.
62

At oral argumen t, Justice O ’Connor comm ented that inherent distinc tiveness is like obscenity
(difficult to d efine, bu t “I know it when I see it”). See Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 72053 at * 6.
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But this prudentially derived conclusion raised another problem, which the
court acknowledged.63 Two Pesos “unquestionably established the legal principle that trade
dress can be inherently distinctive.”64 The Court distinguished Two Pesos, however, by
describing that case as involving “product packaging” (which the Court implies can be
inherently distinctive) “or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has
no bearing on the present case.”65 And because this categorical distinction between
packaging and design would be difficult to define,66 the Court suggested that in close cases,
courts err on the side of classifying trade dress as product design and thus requiring
secondary meaning.67
The Court believed that this pragmatic approach to the difficulties of drawing
a line between design and packaging would be unproblematic because it would occur with
lesser frequency than would the dilemma that would otherwise occur, namely seeking to
determine the inherent distinctiveness of product design.68 Yet this statement ignores two
likely litigation strategies. Because trade dress is often a composite of features and
packaging, to be considered as a whole and not as merely the sum of its parts,69 litigants will
63

The Court’s conclusion also raised the possibility of harm to a producer foreclosed from obtaining
imme diate trademark protection for its inhere ntly distinctive design, and having to wait instead to prove
secondary meaning. But the Court suggested that the availability of a design patent or copyright protection for
designs reduced the level of harm that a producer might suffer. See Wal-Mart Stores, 120 S. Ct. at 1 345 . This
statement is remarkably oblivious to the deficiencies of copyright and design protection for product designs in
the United States. See David G oldenberg, The Long And W inding Road: A History of The Fight Over
Industrial Design Protection In The United States, 45 J. C OPR . S O C 'Y 21, 22-24 (199 7) (discussing design
patent protection); Shira P erlmutter, Conceptual Separability And Copyright In The Designs of Useful Articles,
37 J. C OPR . S O C 'Y 339 (1990) (discussing copyright protection). Indeed, given the inter-relationship of different
forms of intellectual pro perty p rotection for d esigns, see Reichman, supra note 33, it may be that this restriction
on trade dress p rotection may give adde d imp etus to d esign legislation proposals in the U.S. Congress. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of Domestic and International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 24
C OLU M .-V.L.A. J. L. & A RTS 305 (1999) (discussing study of design legislation ordered by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act).
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Wal-M art Stores, 120 S. Ct. at 1345.
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Id. at 1345.
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See Dinw ood ie, supra note 21, at 573-85.
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See W al-Mart Stores, 120 S. Ct. at 1346.

68

See id.
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See, e.g., American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“Trade dress is a comp lex comp osite of features and the law o f unfair competition in respect to trade dre ss
requires that all of the features be considered to gether, not sep arately." ); Pad dingto n Co rp. v. Attiki Impo rts
& Distribs., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 19 93) ("O ne co uld no more deny protection to a trade dress for using
com mon ly used elements than one could deny protection to a trademark because it consisted of a combination
of commonly used letters of the alphabet”).
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likely seek to include some packaging elements in their claimed trade dress to take advantage
of more liberal tests of distinctiveness. In short, this will encourage “category-shopping,”
and thus involve a wholly unnecessary use of judicial resources in seeking to classify the
trade dress in question. This would not be new.70 Moreover, the Court’s dicta suggesting
that the stricter rule may not apply to packaging or some “tertium quid” merely invites
litigation on whether a claimed trade dress constitutes a “tertium quid” akin to packaging
rather than design. In short, the Court’s opinion merely illustrates, rather than solves, the
difficulties of categorical classification.
Although the Wal-Mart opinion will have a limited effect on current
trademark law, because only a small number of product designs can properly be treated as
inherently distinctive,71 it suffers from two important flaws as a means of establishing the
limits of trademark law. First, it creates uncertainty by forcing parties to litigate abstract
questions of classification that are not relevant to the purposes of trademark law. Second,
it entrenches (without any factual support) a generalized assumption of consumer practices
as a rule of law. It thus prevents trademark law from fully reflecting changes in consumer
behavior. In particular, it ignores shifts in social and economic conditions that, prompted by
globalization, have made younger consumers much more visually cognizant. And it ignores
the increasing attention of trademark law to the problem of post-sale confusion.72 The
purposive approach, which the Court followed in Two Pesos and Qualitex, would have
avoided both of these problems. If consumers identify a product by a feature, whether
packaging or design, the purposes of trademark law support the possibility (subject to
countervailing policy concerns) of protection against the confusing simulation of that

70

In Fun-Damental To o, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 11 1 F.3d 99 3 (2d Cir. 199 7), the p laintiff
claimed protection for the trade dress of its product, a novelty bank in the familiar form of a tank toilet. The
product was displayed and sold in stores in an open box. The box bore illustrations of the means of operation,
but the toilet bowl was covered by clear plastic to prevent customers from placing any ob ject in the bow l while
the bank was on display. The defendant's prod uct closely imitated the design of the product, the nature of its
packaging, and the markings on the bo x. Judge M ukasey emp hasized that the plaintiff's product, “alone and
apart from its packaging” was not at issue in the lawsuit. Rather, the trade dress allegedly infringed wa s a
com posite of the product's design and its packaging, and on this basis the district court judge (affirmed by the
Second Circuit) followed the approach of the Second Circuit towards packaging claims. See also Fundex, Inc.
v. Imperial Toy Corp., 26 U .S.P.Q.2d 106 1 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (app lying Abercrom bie to determine inherent
distinctiveness of trade dress comprising composite of product's features and its packaging).
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See Dinw ood ie, supra note 2 1, at 56 3-65 (discussing num ber o f design found to be inherently
distinctive after Two Pesos).
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In the post-sale context, supplemen tary verbal indicators o n packaging or labels ma y be of less
use in distinguishing between two similarly designed products beca use the p ackaging or attached lab els will
often be discarded after purchase.
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feature.73 But this analysis can be performed without consideration of whether that feature
is a design or packaging feature.
II. Scope of Rights: Federal Dilution Protection
Classically, trademark rights protected a mark holder only against uses by a
rival that caused consumer confusion as to the source of the rival’s goods. As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained:
Then what new rights does the trade-mark confer? It does not confer the
right to prohibit the use of the word or words. It is not a copyright . . . A
trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit use of it so far as to protect the
owner’s goodwill against the sale of another’s product as his . . . When the
mark is used in the way that does not deceive the public, we see too much
sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.74
This scope of rights was sufficient both to protect consumers and to prevent
the appropriation of the producer’s goodwill by a competitor passing off its goods as those
of the mark holder. As trademarks came to signify the intangible qualities of a product as
well as its source,75 the scope of rights afforded a trademark holder expanded to protect
against misleading suggestions of association or endorsement. Yet, this expansion in the
scope of rights was accommodated internally within the likelihood of confusion infringement
test.76 The perceptions of the consumer remained central to, and guided, the inquiry.
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The functionality doctrine identifies countervailing objectives that might require moderation of the
producer’s trademark rights. But where a de sign is functional, see supra note 48, balancing these conflicting
objectives should be done in full awareness that denial of any trademark protection undermines full effectuation
of the co nsumer-avo idanc e purpose of trad emark pro tection. See Dinw ood ie, supra note 2, at 729-38.
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Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U .S. 359, 368 (192 4).
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See Nicholas S. Eco nom ides, The Econom ics of Trademarks, 78 T RADEMARK R EP . 523, 527 (1988)
(“By the beginning of the twentieth century trademarks were understood not to be useful in identifying the
source, but rather as identifying a quality standard.”).
76
In 1962, Congress amended section 32 of the Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 S tat. 769, evincing
“a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception of
any kind, no t merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.” Syntex Labs. v. No rwich P harmacal, C o.,
437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971). Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, imposes liability upon
"any person who, without the consent of the registrant, use s . . . the registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or serv ices in co nnection with which suc h use is likely
to cause confusion," but no longer limits actionable confusion to source-confusion. See also 15 U .S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (imposing liability upon any person who, “on or in connection with any goods or services, uses
any word, term, symbol, or device, or false designation of origin, false or mislead ing description o f fact, or false
and misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship or approval of his or her goods,
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In 1995, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.77 This Act
provides that the owner of a famous mark is entitled to enjoin another person’s commercial
use in commerce of that mark if such use causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of: (a) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and the other party, or (b) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. The
enactment of a federal law was intended to provide uniform national protection against
dilution; previously, dilution protection had been available in approximately one half of the
states.78 Under state laws in the United States prior to the enactment of the Federal Dilution
Act of 1995, dilution causes of action generally rested upon proof of “blurring” or
“tarnishment.” The federal statute, although not explicit, has been interpreted as targeting
similar acts.79
Dilution protection is aimed at the harm (the “whittling away” of the
distinctiveness of a mark) that might occur to the producer from the use of the mark on
noncompeting or dissimilar products.80 Under classical infringement analysis, where only
confusion as to source was actionable, the dissimilarity of products might easily preclude a
finding of trademark infringement. But the expanded confusion avoidance rationale now
captures many of these activities and protects the mark in those cases, rendering dilution
protection less urgent.
But why should these limits of trademark protection be set by a contemporary
confusion rationale rather than dilution protection? Dilution protection moves trademark law
away from its basic purpose of mutual consumer and producer protection, and instead
focuses solely on protecting the producer.81 But once untethered from the concept of
services, or commercial activities by another person.”).
77

See 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(c).
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See H.R. Rep. No . 104 -374 . at 3-4 (1 995 ). The failure to preempt state laws may thus undermine
some of the objectives of the legislation. See New Yo rk Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New Y ork, N ew Y ork H otel,
LLC, 69 F. Supp.2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (interpreting federal and New Y ork legislation to be of different
scope).
79

See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. B.E. Windows Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1010,
1016 (S.D.N.Y . 199 6); see also 141 Co ng. Rec. 19310 (da ily ed. Dec. 29, 199 5) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
But see Robert C . Den icola, Some Thoughts On The Dynamic s of Federal Trademark Legislation And The
Trade mark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LA W & C O N TE M P. P R O B . 75, 88-90 (1996) (explaining legislative evolution
of 199 5 statute and concluding that it should not extend to tarnishment claims); Miles J. Alexander and Michael
K. Heilbronner, Dilution Under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, 59 LA W & C O N TE M P. P R O B . 93, 121-125
(1996) (noting that, despite legislative history reference to tarnishment claims, the language of the federal
statute may not support tarnishment claim).
80

See Milton H andler, A Personal Note on Trademark and Unfair Competition Law Before the Lanham
Act, 59 L A W & C O N TE M P. P ROBS . 5, 10-11 (1996).
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See I.P.Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 2 7, 36 (1st Cir. 1998).
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consumer protection, the parallel concept of producer value imposes no a priori limits on the
scope of protection. At what point is protection of the producer too much protection? Which
competitive activities that adversely affect the producer (as competitive activities are wont
to do) are permissible?
The absence of any rational limits is evidenced by the confused and
conclusory nature of judicial opinions applying the dilution law. Recent efforts to explicate
a test for blurring, one of the two actionable effects that constitute dilution, illustrate the
quandary.82 Prior to the federal legislation, the most quoted analysis by which courts had
assessed the claim of blurring was that offered in Judge Sweet’s concurring opinion in Mead
Data Central, Inc. v Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.83 There, in applying the same test under
New York law, Judge Sweet suggested six factors that should be considered.84 These “Sweet
factors” have been applied by several courts under the federal legislation.85
Yet these factors fail to identify or even target a harm other than one grounded
in consumer response; the Sweet factors are a minor variant on the likelihood of confusion
factors.86 This has convinced some courts to suggest that the factors need augmentation87 or
wholesale rejection.88 Yet, the alternative tests that have been formulated are no better. For
example, the First Circuit rejected the Sweet factors, but instituted an inquiry instead “into
whether target consumers will perceive the products as essentially the same.”89 But this test
also falls short of clearly identifying a harm other than consumer confusion. Indeed, to the
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Tarnishment may raise these conc erns in even starker relief. See Robert C . Den icola, Som e Thoug hts
On The Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation And The Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 L A W &
C O N TE M P. P R O B . 75, 8 5-86 (1996) (noting that while protectio n against d ilutio n of a ma rk's distinctiveness is
self-limiting, the tarnishment rationale is not so limited). And one can detect similar problems with the concept
of a “famous mark” upon which dilution protection is conditioned. Despite a statutory laundry list of factors
for courts to co nsider in assessing fame, man y courts fail to con sider the issue, see Lori K rafte, Judicial
Interpretation of The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. C IN . L. R EV . 659 (1998 ) and many others
have offered tortured interp retations of the co ndition. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208
(2d Cir. 1999).
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875 F.2d 1026, 10 35 (2d C ir. 1989) (Sweet J., concurring).
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extent that it differs from the confusion-based test for classical trademark infringement, it
bears strong resemblance to the test of copyright infringement,90 raising further concerns of
offering de facto copyright protection to certain famous words or designs for which copyright
is or may not be available. Such perceived “end-runs” on the limits of copyright91 and patent
protection92 have raised the ire of courts in recent years, and threaten the legitimacy of
trademark law as an autonomous source of regulation.
Finding a test that is both workable and is targeted at a harm that dilution
seeks to redress is difficult because these extended rights have no independent grounding.
By linking the scope of protection to the avoidance of consumer confusion, and thus to an
identifiable harm, trademark law will possess an internal compass that imposes rational
limits (albeit, not the only limits) on its extension. And that compass, in the person of the
consumer, will be one that is responsive to social and economic changes, and thus to the
harms to which trademark law must address itself.
III. Trademarks in Cyberspace: Conflicts with Domain Names
The digital revolution has forced intellectual property law to confront many
new and perplexing issues. In the context of trademark law, particular problems have
resulted from the interaction of trademark rights and ownership of domain name
registrations. The scope of trademark rights is defined by the goods upon which the mark
is used (and by the geographic area in which it is used), thus permitting the use of the same
term by several mark owners on different goods. For example, the term UNITED is used as
a trademark separately by an airline and by a moving company. Domain names are, however,
unique; under the current configuration of the internet and the domain name system, there
can only be one United.com.93
Thus, in the online environment, conflicts over domain name ownership may
arise between two legitimate trademark owners. This has been dealt with, thus far, by the
expedient of adopting a first-come-first-served approach to the allocation of domain names.94
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See Laureyssens v. Idea Group , Inc., 964 F.2d 1 31 (2d C ir. 1992).
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See Jeffrey M ilstein, Inc. v. G reger, Lawlo r, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 3 2 (2d Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging that overextension of trademark law can undermine principles of copyright law); Leigh v.
W arner Bros., Civ. No. 497-340, 1998 WL 351878, at *8-9 (S.D. Ga. June 22, 1998) (noting the potential for
"undermining copyright" by offering trade dress protection to a photograph).
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See Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1 498 (10 th Cir. 1995).
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In fact, it is owned by United A irlines. See http://www.united.com (visited September 6, 2000).
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This expedient may generate other long-term problems. First, it simply avoids the issue of the
appropriate owner of the united.com domain name registration. Second, as business models begin to require
dom ain name registration of the term for which traditional trademark protection is sought, the maintenance of
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But this liberal approach to the allocation of domain names raises other problems. Because
a domain name comprising a trademarked term may easily be first registered by someone
other than the mark owner, there has been extensive litigation and recent federal legislation
regarding the rights that a mark owner has against the owner of a domain name who has no
trademark rights in the term.
Some of the defendants in this type of litigation have been competing
producers using, in an online environment, marks (as domain names) that were confusingly
similar to existing protected marks. Others have been, to use the favored neologism,
“cybersquatters,” that is, persons who had registered domain names consisting of well known
trademarks and then sought to extract payment from the mark owner in return for transfer of
the domain name registration. Early efforts to address the allegedly infringing use of
trademarks as domain names, in either of these categories but particularly the latter, relied
heavily upon the federal dilution legislation. They did so because of statements in the
legislative history expressing the hope that the dilution legislation would assist in redressing
the problem of cybersquatting. But such protection fits uncomfortably within the tendered
justification for dilution protection; the courts have thus shoehorned the factual scenario of
cybersquatting into the dilution statute.
This judicial reaction is perhaps an understandable attempt by courts to err
on the side of protecting intellectual property rights in new technological environments. The
same trend can be seen in the early treatment of software under the copyright laws.95 But it
also reveals two other themes, both of which are pertinent to this Essay. First, the
amorphous, directionless nature of dilution protection permits it to be invoked in an
unlimited range of settings. And, second, if trademark protection online is to be rationally
limited, it must be constructed upon some principle other than reflexive protection for the
property of the mark holder. It must be hitched to something other than the protection of
producer value.

app ropriate competition might require that we infuse som e trademark principles into do main name registration
practices. Althou gh full-scale, trade mark -like searches would both impose significant transaction costs and
impose pecu liarly American notion s of trademark ownership in words, both of which are substantial downsides
to be considered, some incorporation of the notions of trademark law may be helpful. One might consider, for
example, whethe r it is necessary to exclude certain basic terms from domain name ownership, as does trademark
law. Otherwise, such ownership might be too significant a competitive advantage for the domain name owner;
certainly, the prices paid for certain domain names would suggest that such possibilities exist. Similarly,
although it cuts against the grain of international trademark developments, a delayed “use” requirement might
be imposed to maintain domain name ownership. This would provide a small disincentive to domain name
speculation, an activity thus far permitted but which becom es pro blematic if business mo dels effectively require
companion do main name ownership of the term for which trademark registration is sought. Absent any such
restrictions on domain name registration, the depletion of domain names might effectively be transferred into
the trademark system.
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Com pare W helan A ssocs. v. Jaslow Dental La bs., 79 7 F.2 d 12 2 (3d Cir. 1986) with Computer
Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Some courts have begun this task.96 They have done so primarily in the
context of classical infringement analysis, tailored to protection of the consumer against an
expanded range of actionable confusion. This guiding purpose requires courts to construct
a cyber-consumer, by inquiring as to consumer understandings that online shopping,
marketing, and browsing creates. These understandings, which inevitably and appropriately
involve the use and meaning of domain names, thus will enable a scope of limited trademark
rights to be established in the online environment.
In Congress, a different approach is being adopted. Trademark owners have
singled out particular contexts, such as cybersquatting, in which their interests are at stake,
and have sought property-like protection in those settings. Thus, Congress recently enacted
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,97 which creates a new Section 43(d) of the
Lanham Act.98 Section 43(d) now provides a cause of action against anyone who, with
bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of another's trademark or service marks,
“registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or
[in the case of famous marks] dilutive of such trademark.” It is important to recognize first
that this legislation addresses only one of the many dilemmas that cyberspace raises for
trademark law, and, second, that trademark owners will likely seek additional legislation to
address concrete, new categories of behavior.99 Yet, the approach of serially legislating
96

See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sump ton, 18 9 F.3 d 86 8 (9th Cir. 1999 ) (dilution); Brookfield
Comm s., Inc. v. West Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999 ).
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Pub. L. 106-113 , Tit. III (1999).
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The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem action against the domain name
established under paragraph (2) of the new Section 43(d) are in addition to any other civil action or remedy
otherwise applicable. Damages and injunctive relief will be available for violations of the new law , see id. §
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damages are not available with respect to the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name that occurs
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The statute also creates a cause of action in Section 3002(b) intended to offer additional protections
for individuals. This provides that “any person who registers a domain name [on or after December 2, 1999]
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3002(b )(1)(A). However, no cause of action will exist under this separate provision if a registration of such
a name is made in good faith and is used in, affiliated with, or related to a protected work of authorship, and
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stronger trademark protection with respect to one category of cyber-behavior at a time will
always be behind the curve of harmful activities and will be devoid of rational limits that
derive from sources other than the practical constraints of political power – a problem of
political economy not unique to trademark law, of course. Hewing close to the basic
purposes of trademark law, and being guided by the internal compass of protecting the
integrity of consumer understandings, would both provide rational limits and afford courts
the flexibility to tackle new issues as they arise.
Conclusion
In its most recent trademark cases, the Supreme Court has charted an
uncertain path for trademark law. That uncertainty stems in part from the Court’s own
ambivalence about committing to a purposive approach to trademark law. Such an approach,
seen in Two Pesos and Qualitex, may suggest to some only an expansionist vision of
trademark protection. And in those two cases, to be sure, the Court favored the position of
trademark owners. But purposive analysis, rooted in consumer confusion avoidance, is not
inherently expansionist. It will offer broad protection only where the integrity of consumer
understanding is severely threatened, and less where that is not so. It can supply a coherence
to trademark law that cannot be achieved by judicial or legislative attention to competitive
behavior on a category-by-category approach. And it can ensure that trademark law responds
flexibly to changing markets. Finally, because the purposes of trademark law are limited in
nature, purposive analysis can establish rational limits to trademark law in ways that ad hoc
legislative protection of producer value cannot.

or canc ellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the plaintiff (or, in its discretion,
award costs and attorneys fees to the prevailing party).
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2005 Postscript to The Rational Limits of Trademark Law
In the time since the preceding Essay was written, the courts have been the site for
the principal developments of the three issues of trademark law covered in the Essay. Some
of those judicial decisions have borne out concerns I expressed in 2000 (e.g., trade dress
protection and dilution causes of action remain shrouded in uncertainty, lacking direction),
while others suggest that my fears were over-stated (e.g., there has been little of the
“category-shopping” I predicted in trade dress litigation). Yet, none of these developments
calls into question the basic thesis of the Essay: the coherence of modern U.S. trademark law
is being undermined by a failure expressly to link its development to its basic purposes. To
be sure, in each of its four opinions since 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed or
articulated limits on the availability or scope of trademark protection. Taken with Wal-Mart,
this group of twenty-first century cases may signal an unease with the unbridled expansion
of trademark rights. And, significantly, while some of those limits can be deduced from the
internal consumer protection rationale discussed in the 2000 Essay, others reflect sources or
purposes that might be viewed as external (or often peripheral) to trademark law.
Incorporating these broader purposes within trademark analysis remains a crucial task, but
one that may fall largely to scholars if the Supreme Court continues to speak only obliquely
on its basic approach to trademark policy.
In the context of trade dress, Wal-Mart has indeed obliged many courts to address the
unduly metaphysical question of whether trade dress is “product design” or “product
packaging.” However, ready reliance by courts on the Supreme Court’s instruction to err,
in close cases, toward a “design” classification has over time made this satellite question less
consumptive of judicial resources. Indeed, as predicted, the rule announced in Wal-Mart has
had little direct effect on the availability of trade dress protection because few designs would
under any standard likely be regarded as inherently distinctive. However, taken with the
trade dress case handed down by the Court in 2001, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc.,100 it can now be seen as a clear signal to lower courts to rein in product design
trade dress protection.
The TrafFix Court highlighted the vitality of the functionality doctrine101 in product
design trade dress litigation. The Court’s confirmation of what it previously said (in a
footnote) in Inwood and (in dicta) in Qualitex, namely, that “in general terms, a product
feature is functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the
cost or quality of the article,” was hardly radical. However, the Court also disapproved the
lower court’s reliance on both insubstantial anticompetitive effect and the availability of
alternative designs to save the plaintiff from a functionality determination. These holdings
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(if faithfully followed) might have greatly contracted trade dress protection. But because the
Court failed to explain how its test applied absent regard to competition or alternatives – and,
more importantly, how its test meshed with the purposes of trademark law – lower courts
have easily managed to avoid the full effects of the Court’s decision.
Likewise, the TrafFix Court’s other functionality holding – that where trade dress
rights were claimed in the design of an article that had previously been the subject of a utility
patent since expired, that utility patent is “strong evidence that the features therein claimed
are functional” – has raised more questions than it has answered. And, again, this is because
of a failure by the Court to explain the purpose behind the rule it announced. Was this rooted
in the competitive advantages of a patented feature or a concern for the integrity of the patent
system? A later case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,102 in which the
Court held that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act did not prevent the unaccredited copying
and distribution of an uncopyrighted public domain work, suggests that the Court may indeed
be concerned about the encroachment of trademark law into other areas of intellectual
property law. But, as in TrafFix, we are left to speculate because the Court strictly rested its
opinion on an unsatisfying dissection of the word “origin” in Section 43(a). The Court’s real
concerns about the expansion of trademark and unfair competition law are raised only
tangentially, teasing but hardly clear.
Just as trade dress law has seen the Supreme Court insisting on limits (however
poorly articulated), the Court has since 2000 interpreted the dilution statute in ways that
address some of the concerns I expressed about the potentially capacious scope of dilution
law. In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,103 the Court held that a plaintiff seeking relief
under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act must show actual rather than a mere likelihood of
dilution in order to make out a claim. Thus, the dilution protection which I suggested lacked
satisfactory theoretical foundation was indeed cut back, but by using a textual interpretation
almost certainly inconsistent with legislative intent. As such, it is a limit that is not likely
to last; indeed, it is already the subject of congressional efforts to over-ride. Courts and
scholars still have not fully explained “blurring” or “tarnishment” in other than conclusory
or talismanic phrases that offer very little guidance to producers and the public. This
continuing gap merely confirms my insistence on grounding protection in consumer
confusion.
Change has been most fast-moving (though as yet untouched by the Supreme Court)
in the context of trademark law online. Attention has have moved beyond the cybersquatting
activities that consumed Congress and the courts in 1998-1999 (though a reduced volume
of cybersquatting cases remain in the courts). Courts are beginning to grapple with the
application of confusion-based doctrines (most notably, initial interest confusion) in the
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richer array of situations that arise in the online environment. Although these decisions have
not yet reached a stage of ideal consistency or equilibrium, the courts are proceeding
blessedly free from further congressional intervention.
Because the doctrines that are guiding these courts are, unlike early cybersquatting
cases, grounded in consumer protection justifications, there would appears to be sufficient
basis for courts to recognize appropriate limits on trademark regulation of banner, keyword,
and pop-up advertising. Yet, courts may find that although these classic purposes do
establish some limits on trademark rights, other limits may also be necessary. In particular,
courts might need to recognize that trademark law both reflects and constructs the market;
on occasion, trademark rules will proactively shape that market by developing new limits on
the scope of trademark rights. Some courts are thus restricting the expansion of trademark
rights online through rules such as the requirement that the defendant be using “as a mark.”
At present, such rules have lacked a full theoretical justification. But if limits linked to
consumer-confusion are insufficient (though necessary) to establish an ideal scope of
trademark protection, it is incumbent upon scholars to develop those other justifications and
to integrate them into a purposive analysis of trademark law.

